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Environmental Law -Administrative

Law-

FEDERAL WATER POL-

LUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972-FEDERAL COURT
REVIEW

OF EPA

RECOMMENDATIONS TO STATE POLLUTION CONTROL

AGENCY

Shell Oil Co. v. Train,
585 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1978)
Since the dawn of environmental legislation in the 1970's,'
courts and litigants have tussled with problems of judicial review.
Because of the stakes involved and the inscrutability of the statutes, 2 environmentalists and polluters alike seek redress in the
courts. This often protracted litigation compounds the already
tremendous administrative burdens and time pressures placed on
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).4 Shell Oil Co. v.

In 1971 Judge J. Skelly Wright wrote: "These cases are only the beginning of what
promises to become a flood of new litigation- litigation seeking judicial assistance in protecting our natural environment. Several recently enacted statutes attest to the commitment
of the Government to control, at long last, the destructive engine of material 'progress.'"
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d
1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted). See generally Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509 (1974).
2 The Supreme Court has acknowledged the less than obvious character of complex
environmental legislation. In Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S.
60, 75 (1975), dealing with statutory construction of the Clean Air Act, the Court stated:
"Without going so far as to hold that the Agency's construction of the Act was the only one
it permissibly could have adopted, we conclude that it was at the very least sufficiently
reasonable that it should have been accepted by the reviewing courts."
3 The major environmental statutes have each generated extensive histories of litigation over the nature of available judicial review. See, e.g., Parenteau & Tauman, The Effluent
Limitations Controversy: Will Careless Draftsmanship Foil the Objectives of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972?, 6 ECOL. L.Q. 1 (1976); Stewart, The Development of
Administrative and Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw in JudicialReview of Environmental Decisionmaking:
Lessons From the Clean Air Act, 62 IowA L. REv. 713 (1977); Yarrington, Judicial Review of
Substantive Agency Decisions: A Second Generation of Cases Under the National Environmental
Policy Act, 19 S.D. L. Rav. 279 (1974).
4 "[I] acknowledge the importance of minimizing procedural complexity and delay in
the issuance and enforcement of NPDES permits. Accordingly, I would be reluctant to
create a rule which may result in protracted litigation prior to issuance." Shell Oil Co. v.
Train, 585 F.2d 408, 418-19 (9th Cir. 1978) (dissenting opinion, Wallace, J.). See Kennecott
Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 849-50 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (court noted "need to avoid
procedural strait jackets that would seriously hinder" the EPA's performance). The environmental acts typically contain specific administrative time schedules. See, e.g., Clean Air
Act, §§ 107, 108, 109, 111(b), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7407, 7409, 7411(b) (West Supp. 1978);
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, §§ 301(b)(1)(A), 304(a)(1),
304(b), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(A), 1314(a)(1), 1314(b) (1976). Typically, the overwhelmed
EPA cannot comply. See E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 122 (1977).
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Train 5 presents a novel problem arising under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 6 (Act): whether a
federal court can review an informal "recommendation" by the
EPA that a state pollution control agency deny a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit.7 The Ninth
Circuit properly denied review, but its opinion includes flawed
reasoning and fails to expose the problems accompanying judicial
review of EPA recommendations.
I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Until 1972, primary responsibility for battling the national
water pollution crisis rested on the states.8 Convinced that the
states were losing badly, 9 Congress took command and announced, in the Act, unequivocal goals 10 and a new strategy. Unlike earlier federal legislation that featured general "water quality
standards,"" the Act imposes direct, specific limitations on individual point sources. 2 The NPDES, which allows discharge of
pollutants by permit only,'" forms the heart of the Act. Section
5 585 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1978).
r 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Act], as amended by Clean Water
Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566.
Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976).
a The states "were to decide the uses of water to be protected, the kinds and amounts
of pollutants to be permitted, the degree of pollution abatement to be required, the time to
be allowed a polluter for abatement." S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971),
reprinted in [19721 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3668, 3675; 2 SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC
WORKS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS

OF

1972, at 1426 (1973) [hereinafter cited as LEG. HST.].
9 The Senate Committee on Public Works wrote: "After five years, many States do not
have approved standards. Officials are still working to establish relationships between pollutants and water uses. Time schedules for abatement are slipping away because of failure
to enforce, lack of effluent controls, and disputes over Federal-State standards." S. RaE.
No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
3675.
10 The Act requires attainment of water quality sufficient to support fish, wildlife, and
recreation by 1983 (Act § 101(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1976)) and total elimination of
pollutant discharge by 1985 (Act § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976)).
" The Act's predecessor, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1965, required
states to develop water quality standards. 33 U.S.C. § 1160 (1970) (amended 1972).
12 Act § 301(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(e) (1976). Point sources are facilities from which pollutants are discharged, such as oil refineries.
13 Act § 402(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1976). A prior federal permit system existed
under the Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970) (amended 1972). However, it had
limited application and did not function effectively. See S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3672; 2 LEG. HIST., supra
note 8, at 1423.
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402(a) 14 authorizes the EPA administrator to issue the permits;
section 402(b) 15 empowers him to delegate permit authority to
states submitting plans that comply with the Act's guidelines. 1 6
The states may tighten the anti-pollution standards,' but cannot
relax them.' 8 Although the states may thus acquire substantial
administrative authority, the EPA stands as guardian of the Act's
integrity.' 9 State agencies must transmit all permit applications to
the EPA, which can veto any permit that fails to satisfy the Act.2 0
Section 509(b)(1), 2 ' the Act's sole judicial review section, provides in part:
Review of the Administrator's action ... (F) in issuing or

denying any permit under section 402, may be had by any interested person in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United
States for the Federal judicial district in which such person resides or transacts such business upon application by such per-

14 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1976).
15 Id. § 1342(b).
16 Act § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1976) states: "It is the policy of the Congress to

recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent,
reduce, and eliminate pollution ... and to consult with the Administrator in the exercise of
his authority under this Act." Representative Wright, House Manager of the Act, remarked: "The managers ... look for and expect State and local interest, initiative, and
personnel to provide a much more effective program than that which would result from
control in the regional offices of the Environmental Protection Agency." 118 CONG. REC.
33761 (1972), reprinted in 1 LEG. HisT., supra note 8, at 262.
'1 Nothing in Act § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1976) prevents the state programs
from exceeding the Act's requirements.
is Act § 402(b)(1), (b)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1), (b)(2) directs that state programs must
ensure compliance with Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Effluent Limitations), Act § 302, 33
U.S.C. § 1312 (Water Quality Related Effluent Limitations), Act § 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1316
(National Standards of Performance), Act § 307, 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (Toxic and Pretreatment
Effluent Standards), Act § 308, 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (Inspection, Monitoring and Entry), Act
§ 403, 33 U.S.C. § 1343 (Ocean Discharge Criteria), and other more limited requirements.
19 Disputes between the EPA and a state threaten the uniformity of application upon
which the Act depends. See note 22 and accompanying text infra. Congress created the veto
power to promote uniformity in administration. Some commentators expressed concern
that, absent EPA veto power, the states would compete for industry through relaxed pollution standards. See 118 CONG. RE:c. 10250 (1972), reprintedin 1 LEG. HIST., supra note 8, at
472-73 (remarks of Gov. Anderson); 118 CoNG. REc. 10662 (1972), reprinted in I LEG.
HisT., supra note 8, at 577 (remarks of Rep. Reuss). If the EPA disagreed with a state over
a central requirement of the Act, the dispute would likely reproduce itself in subsequent
permit applications while the courts were deciding the issue. If one state implemented a
relaxed requirement, others might follow suit. In Shell, there was a three-year lag between
the issuance of the recommendation and the court of appeals decision. A similar time lag
involving a veto would severely impede administration of the Act.
20 Act § 402(d)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(1) (1976) (transmission to EPA); Act § 402(d)(2),
33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (1976) (veto power).
21 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (1976).
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son. Any such application shall be made within ninety days
from the date of such determination, approval, promulgation,
issuance or denial, or after such date only if such application is
based solely on grounds which arose after such ninetieth day.
The legislative history reveals that Congress specified original review in the courts of appeals in order to achieve uniform determinations in matters of more than local importance,12 and to limit
review in the interests of administrative efficiency. 23 Although
the Act does not mention district court review, and the legislative
history does not clearly indicate its availability for actions falling
outside the categories of section 509(b)(1)(F),2 4 some courts 2 5 have
22

Because many of these administrative actions are national in scope and require

even and consistent national application ... [t]his section specifies that any review of such actions shall be in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. For review of permits issued under section 402 and other
actions which run only to one region, the section places jurisdiction in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Circuit in which the affected State or region, or portion thereof, is located.
S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3751; 2 LEG. HisT., supra note 8, at 1503. The provision for review in the
District of Columbia Circuit was dropped in the final Act.
23 The House Report stated: "The Committee believes with the number and complexity
of administrative determinations that the legislation requires there is a need to establish a
clear and orderly process for judicial review. Section 509 will ensure that administrative
actions are reviewable, but that the review will not unduly impede enforcement." H. REP.
No. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 136 (1972), reprinted in 1 LEG. HiST., supra note 8, at
822-23. There was particular concern about whether the EPA could meet the time requirements prescribed by the Act. See S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1972),
reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3750; 2 LEG. HIsT., supra note 8, at 1503.
The concern was justified. See E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 122
(1977).
24 The House Report stated "that the inclusion of section 509 is not intended to
exclude judicial review under other provisions of the legislation that are otherwise permitted by law." H. REP. No. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 136 (1972), reprinted in 1 LEG. HiST.,
supra note 8, at 823. While the House bill provided for original review of the enumerated
actions in district court, the conference committee substituted exclusive review in the courts
of appeals, with no mention of district court review. S. REP. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 147-48 (1972) (conference report), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
3824-25; 1 LEc. HIsT., supra note 8, at 330-31. This change undercuts the House Report
comment that § 509 was not intended to limit district court review. The Senate Report
accompanying the Act stated: "The Courts have granted [judicial] review to those being
regulated and to those who seek 'to protect the public interest in the proper administration
of a regulatory system.. .'. Since precluding review does not appear to be warranted or
desirable, the bill would specifically provide for such review within controlled time
periods." S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 85, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3750; 2 LEG. HisT., supra note 8, at 1503. This comment indicates that the
Senate Committee on Public Works felt a need to define and control judicial review, and
felt that § 509(b) accomplished that purpose.
2' See Washington v. EPA, 573 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1978); Save the Bay, Inc. v.
Administrator, 556 F.2d 1282, 1293 (5th Cir. 1977); C.P.C. Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d

890

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:886

found such review available
under section 10 of the Administra26
tive Procedure Act (APA).

Several courts have wrestled with the availability of review for
EPA veto decisions. In Save the Bay, Inc. v. Administrator,1 the
Fifth Circuit considered an EPA determination not to veto a permit, and found a very limited district court review available under
section 10 of the APA." 8 In Mianus River PreservationCommittee v.
Administrator,2 9 the EPA failed to review a permit. The Second
Circuit held that review of this administrative decision was unavailable in the courts of appeals.3 0
Prior to Shell, in Washington v. EPA, 3 the Ninth Circuit decided that an EPA veto of a state agency decision was not an "action" for purposes of section 509(b)(1)(F).3
The court reasoned
that this section was designed solely for the period during which
the Administrator of the EPA had direct responsibility for permit
issuance; the provision was inapplicable once the state assumed
responsibility. 3 However, the court found that review was available in district courts under the APA.3 4
II
SHELL OIL Co.

v. TRAIN

In 1971 Shell sought'a discharge permit for a combined petroleum refinery and organic chemical plant. In 1973 the EPA approved California's NPDES program. The California Regional
Water Quality Review Board (Regional Board) classified Shell's
facility as a Class E refinery. 3 5 Shell sought classification as a
Class D facility or, alternatively, a variance 36 from the Class E re1032, 1038 (8th Cir. 1975). But see E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112
(1977) (regulations specifying effluent limitations under Act § 304, 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (1976)
reviewable in courts of appeals, not in district court as held below and in C.P.C. Int'l, Inc.
v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975)).
26 5 U.S.C. § 701-06 (1976).
27 556 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1977).
28 The review extends only to whether EPA had considered all relevant factors and no
unlawful factors in making its determination. Id. at 1296.
29 541 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1976).
30 Id.

at 909-10.

31 573 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1978).
32 Id. at 586-87.

33 Id.
34 Id.
31 See
36 See

at 586. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
at 588.
Subpart E-Integrated Subcategory, 40 C.F.R. § 419.50 (1978).
Effluent limitation guidelines representing the degree of effluent reduction at-

tainable by the application of the best practicable control technology currently available, 40
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quirements. In 1975 the EPA "recommended," 37 without formal
veto, that the Regional Board deny the variance. The Board followed the recommendation. Under California law,3 8 Shell sought
review of the Regional Board's decision by the California Water
Resources Control Board (State Board). At the same time, Shell
commenced actions in federal district court3 9 and the Court of
40
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit quickly dismissed, finding no "federal action" sufficient to invoke jurisdiction under section
509(b)(1)(F). 4 ' In the district court action, Shell alleged that the
recommendation was in effect a veto, and therefore was reviewable under Washington v. EPA. 42 The court dismissed the petition
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the court held that Shell
had demonstrated nothing more than "advice" by the EPA,43 and
that "failure to disapprove a state administrative action" did not
constitute federal action sufficient to invoke federal review. 44 Shell
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
Meanwhile, after the district court and initial Ninth Circuit
opinions, but before issuance of the present opinions, the State
Board reversed the Regional Board and granted the variance.45
By the time the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision, the EPA had recast the recommendation as a veto.4 6 The
court considered only the effect of the EPA's recommendation; it

C.F.R. § 419.52 (1978). Variances are authorized by Act § 402(d)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(1)
(1976) (transmittal to EPA) and Act § 402(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (1976) (veto). See
Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 585 F.2d 408, 416 (9th Cir. 1978) (dissenting opinion, Wallace, J.).
'7 The "recommendation" was given pursuant to a "memorandum of understanding"
between the EPA and the Regional Board. 585 F.2d at 411. This informal recommendation
process is not explicitly sanctioned in the Act. However, Act § 402(d)(1), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(d)(1) (1976) provides that states must forward every permit request to the EPA and
must give the agency notice of every action taken, including granting the permit. The
notice provision of § 402(d)(1) seems to envision a sub-veto interaction between states and
the EPA. See note 92 infra.
38 CAL. WATER CODE § 13320(a) (West Supp. 1978).
39 Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 415 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Cal. 1976), affd, 585 F.2d 408 (9th Cir.
1978).
40 Shell Oil Co. v. Train, No. 75-2070 (9th Cir., Sept. 30, 1975).
41 Id.

42 573 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1978). See text accompanying notes 31-34 supra.
43 Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 415 F. Supp. 70, 77 (N.D. Cal. 1976), affid, 585 F.2d 408 (9th
Cir. 1978).
44 Id. at 77-78.
45 585 F.2d at 412.
41 Id. The dissent also felt that these developments should be disregarded for purposes
of the present determination. Id. at 418 (dissenting opinion, Wallace, J.).
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registered less than eager anticipation of Shell's impending appeal
47
of the EPA's veto.
In affirming the district court's dismissal, the Shell majority
construed the complaint to allege that the EPA had somehow
compelled the Regional Board to deny the permit and variance. 48 They felt that such "undue influence" or "coercion"
analysis would endanger countless cooperative federal-state programs, 49 presumably by raising tenth amendment problems. 50 Because the Supreme Court has long held such programs constitutional, 5 1 the majority found Shell's allegations "unsupported and
...unsupportable." 52 They distinguished Washington v. EPA on
the ground that it had involved an actual veto.53 The majority
also noted that review was unavailable under section 10 of the

47 Id. at 412.
48

Id. at 413.

49 Id. at 413-14.
5o Id.

51 Id. The court cited Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127
(1947), and Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). Oklahoma held that § 12 of
the Hatch Act, allowing the Civil Service Commission to remove a state official for political
activities, did not run afoul of the tenth amendment. Steward Machine held that a tax credit
provision for states with.unemployment programs did not violate the tenth amendment.
The court also mentioned National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) as an
example of potential constitutional problems. In that case, however, the Supreme Court
found a federal requirement invalid as a violation of the tenth amendment (id. at 852),
indicating that the presence of tenth amendment problems should not be a barrier to
judicial consideration.
In all these cases, plaintiffs specifically alleged unconstitutional coercion. Neither the
court of appeals nor the district court opinion, 415 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Cal. 1976), indicates
that Shell alleged unconstitutionality. Judge Wallace quoted the "essence" of the complaint:
Although the application for a variance was ostensibly made to and the variance
was ostensibly denied by the Regional Board, and although the Permit was ostensibly issued by the Regional Board, the Administrator, through his subordinates, made all material decisions by which the variance was denied and by
which the Permit issued and instructed the Regional Board to follow those decisions.
585 F.2d at 417 n.5 (dissenting opinion, Wallace, J.). If federal reversal of a state permit
involves "coercion," then that "coercion" is explicitly authorized by the Act's veto provision,
§ 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1976). Shell did not challenge the constitutionality of EPA
recommendations or of the veto provision; the allegation of functional equivalance between
a recommendation and a veto should raise no constitutional issue. The language of the
complaint alleged that the Regional Board acquiesced in the EPA's decisions. The cases
cited by the majority involving overt constitutional challenges are inapposite.
52 585 F.2d at 414.
53 Id. at 413.
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APA 54 because the recommendation was not fina 5 5 and because
adequate review was available in the state courts.56
Judge Wallace, in dissent, rejected the majority's federalism
analysis and read Shell's complaint to allege that the recommendation functioned as a veto, and should be reviewed as such. 57 Because vetoes are authorized by the Act, 58 this reading raises no
constitutional issues. 59 Judge Wallace felt that "informal vetoes"
should be reviewed in the same terms as actual vetoes. 60 Consequently he viewed the case as presenting a factual question as to
whether the EPA actually "made" the decision to deny the variance.6 ' Since a motion for pretrial dismissal requires the court
to accept the opposing parties' allegations,6 2 the dissent would
63
have remanded the case to the district court.
III
ANALYSIS

A. The Availability of Nonstatutory Judicial Review
Many administrative statutes provide for review of agency action in the courts of appeals. 64 Courts and commentators quarrel, however, over the availability of "nonstatutory" judicial
review, or review of actions not included in the statutes' review
provisions.6 5 Section 10 of the APA 6 6 authorizes and limits
nonstatutory review. Review is available for final agency actions

54 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1976).
55 The court argued that the fact that "[t]he decision that Shell sought to have the
district court review no longer has any operative significance ... shows at a minimum that
the challenged decision was not final." 585 F.2d at 414.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 420-21 (dissenting opinion, Wallace, J.).
38 Act § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1976).
,5 See note 51 supra.
60 585 F.2d at 419 (dissenting opinion, Wallace, J.).
61 Id. at 420.
62 Id. at 418.
63 Id. at 421.
64 See 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3568 (1975).
" See, e.g., K. DAVIS, ArImNSTRATIvE LAW OF THE SEVENrIEs § 28.08 (1976); Byse &
Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory"Judicial Review
of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV. L. REV. 308 (1967); Cramton, Nonstatutory Review
of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject
Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REv. 387 (1970).
66 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1976).
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which have no other adequate remedy in court,6 7 and are not
precluded from review by statute6 8 or committed to agency discretion by law. 69

Oft-quoted Supreme Court decisions have spoken

of a strong presumption of reviewability absent "clear and convincing evidence" of contrary legislative intent.7 ° Similarly, in
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,"' the Court construed the
APA's discretion exception narrowly to apply only when the statute is "drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no
72
law to apply."
Lower courts employ criteria for reviewability more flexible
than either the Supreme Court or APA formulations. Professor
Davis writes:
Whether or not the agency finds "law to apply," courts generally follow the presumption of reviewability unless (a) congressional intent, whether or not clear and whether or not explicitly
stated, is discernible to cut off review, (b) the issues are for
some reason deemed inappropriate to judicial determination, or
(c) the courts find
some other reason they deem sufficient for
73
denying review.
Essentially, courts may find actions unreviewable because of per75
ceived legislative intent,7 4 or for any other good reason.

67 Id.
68

Id. § 701(a)(1).

'9 Id. § 701(a)(2).
70See, e.g., Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156 (1970); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141
(1967).
71 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
72Id. at 410 (quoting S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945)).
" K. DAvIs, supra note 65, § 28.16-1, at 641 (1976). See generally id. §§ 28.08 to 28.16-1.
74 Legislative history can reveal implied intent to preclude review. See Ted Bates & Co.
v. FTC, 515 F.2d 367, 370 (D.C. Cir. 1975); K. DAvIS, supra note 65, at § 28.09. In Boire v.
Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1963), the Supreme Court used legislative history to preclude review in a situation strongly analogous to Shell. Section 10 of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976), provides for review of "final orders" in the courts of
appeals. The statement does not expressly preclude review of other decisions. The Supreme Court, citing legislative intent to delay review until after elections had been held,
concluded that certification decisions were not "final orders" reviewable in the courts of
appeals. Id. at 479. The Court further held that legislative intent precluded district court
review, except under the narrow exception of Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 189 (1958),
where the NLRB "attempted exercise of [a]power that had been specifically withheld." 376
U.S. at 480.
75 In discussing the 1976 amendments to the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1976), the House Committee on the Judiciary noted that the amendments left the scope of
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B. Federal Court Review of EPA Recommendations
Shell contended, and the dissent accepted, that reviewability
of recommendations should be a question of fact.7
Shell sought
access to district court to prove that the EPA's recommendation
functioned as a veto and demanded equivalent reviewability.
While this theory does not disinter the constitutional ghosts that
troubled the majority, it falters over considerations of legislative
intent and simple practicality. Ad hoc determination of reviewability cannot coexist peacefully with the Act's goals of limiting review
for administrative efficiency, 78 and preserving substantial state au79
tonomy.
Shell's theory would allow plaintiffs into court to litigate the
threshold question of whether an EPA recommendation was in
fact a veto. During the initial factual inquiry, the court would
focus on the state decisionmakers. Because the EPA cannot compel a state agency to accept a recommendation, the court would
have to determine that the state officials accepted the recommendation as conclusive.8 0 Thus, informal EPA "advice" would in effect subject the state agency to federal review. This result clashes
with the Act's goal of preserving state autonomy.8 ' Moreover,
the court would have to inquire into the mental processes of the
decisionmakers-a burdensome and probably inconclusive procedure.
If the court found an "informal veto," the focus of the trial
would shift to the EPA for evaluation of the recommendation on
the merits-another burdensome and time consuming determination. Since the Act does not mention recommendations, let alone
provide standards for their use, the court would have to go fishjudicial review unaffected. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1976),
reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6135. The committee provided a list of
limitations on judicial review:
These ... include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) extraordinary
relief should not be granted because of the hardship to the defendant or to the
public ("balancing the equities") or because the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law; (2) action committed to agency discretion; (3) express or implied
preclusion of judicial review; (4) standing; (5) ripeness; (6) failure to exhaust
administrative remedies; and (7) an exclusive alternative remedy.
Id. at 12, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6132.
76 See note 51 & 61 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra.
78 See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
o See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
so See text accompanying note 61 supra.
"' See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
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ing for "law to apply."8 2 Moreover, it might well have to decide
the merits on an inadequate record. 3 Even if the court found an
"informal veto" and held it unwarranted under the Act, the court
could not bind the state agency or state courts. Regardless of the
factual determination, the state remains the technical decision84
maker and the federal court exercises no jurisdiction over it.
The only value of a judgment on a recommendation would be to
influence the state decision, 85 or to forestall a subsequent EPA
veto. In either case, federal review is duplicative and unnecessary. 6
Review of recommendations would also impose an undesirable rigidity on federal-state interactions. The Act is designed to
allow the states to make the bulk of permit decisions. 87 Large
scale EPA intervention is objectionable because it infringes on
state autonomy and spreads the EPA too thin. If recommenda-

"2 See text accompanying notes 71-72 supra; see generally K. DAVIS, supra note 65,

§§ 28.16 & 28.16-1 (1976). On Shell's theory, the court would apply the law applicable to
vetoes: to justify a recommendation of denial, the permit would have to violate the Act's
guidelines. Courts have limited ability to judge technical determinations on the merits, and
usually confine their review to whether the agency took a "hard look" at the problem. See
Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509,
541-42 (1974). Judge Leventhal ought to know. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (majority opinion, Leventhal, J.). One virtue of the
recommendation process is that it enables the EPA to give general guidance without taking
burdensome "hard looks" at individual permits. In any case, the EPA cannot be fairly held
to a veto-level review on the merits simply because the state acquiesced in the recommendation. Instead, the state decision should be reviewed in state court. See text following note
93 infra.
13 If EPA makes recommendations without a "hard look" (see note 82 supra), there will
likely be a scanty record. Courts sometimes take the adequacy of the record into consideration in determining reviewability. See Save the Bay, Inc. v. Administrator, 556 F.2d 1282,
1291-92 (5th Cir. 1977).
8' The controlling federal review statutes, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (1976) (Act) and 5
U.S.C. § 704 (1976) (APA), provide only for the review of federal agency action, not that
of a state agency. Because a state can impose requirements stricter than those provided in
the Act (see note 17 and accompanying text supra), a state denial of a permit should not
generate "arising under" jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
'5 Since, even under Shell's formulation, reviewability depends on state acquiescence,
the initial state decision will have been made well before review of the recommendation.
The fact that a federal judgment might "influence" a subsequent state agency or court
decision hardly justifies federal review. Judge Wallace in dissent felt that a state court
might order the state to comply with a federal recommendation. 585 F.2d at 420 (dissenting opinion, Wallace, J.). Judge Wallace supported this unlikely result by citing California
regulations, and the "Memorandum of Understanding" between the State Board and the
EPA. Id. at 416 n.4. His analysis falters; the cited provisions refer to vetoes, not recommendations. In fact, in Shell the State Board overruled the recommendation. Id. at 412.
"8 There is little efficiency in anticipating vetoes which may not occur.
87 See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
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tions are to be reviewed because they are functionally "vetoes,"
presumably they must meet the same standards.8 8 Consequently,
exposure to federal review would hold the EPA responsible for
the merits of every permit upon which it made a recommendation. Such a requirement would drastically limit the flexibility of
89
recommendations and probably curtail their use altogether.
Recommendations allow the EPA to give general advice without invoking the "all-or-nothing" consequences of a veto. It can
make recommendations without dictating state decisions, without
committing itself to full-scale investigation of the permits, and
without exposing itself to federal review. The recommendation is
one factor used by the state in a more comprehensive decisionmaking process. The Act's policies of state autonomy9 and limitation of review 9 ' support these goals. Such "sub-veto" level interaction is consistent with the Act's provisions authorizing EPA review
92
of permits.
88 See note 82 and accompanying text supra.

If a recommendation is reviewable on the merits as a veto, the EPA would have to
make a veto-level investigation. There would be no apparent reason to make a recommendation rather than a veto. Since vetoes were intended to be used sparingly and only for
exceptionally significant permits, federal-state relations would be unduly restricted. Representative Wright, House manager of the Act, remarked: "I must give added emphasis to
this point. The managers expect the Administrator to use [the veto] authority judiciously; it
is their intent that the Act be administered in such a manner that the abilities of the States
to control their own permit programs will be developed and strengthened." 118 CONG.
REC. 33761 (1972), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIsr., supra note 8 at 262. The Senate Report stated:
"[T]he Committee expects that, after delegation, the Administrator will withhold his review
of proposed permits which are not of major significance." S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3737; 2 LEG. Hxsr., supra
note 8, at 1489.
0 See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
e1 See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
92 While not expressly mentioning recommendations, Act § 402(d)(1), (d)(2), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(d) (1976) provides:
(1) Each State shall transmit to the Administrator a copy of each permit application received by such State and provide notice to the Administrator of every
action related to the consideration of such permit application, including each
permit proposed to be issued by such State.
(2) No permit shall issue (A) if the Administrator within ninety days of the date
of his notification [regarding interstate pollution problems], or (B) if the Administrator within ninety days of the date of transmittal of the proposed permit
by the State objects in writing to the issuance of such permit as being ouside the
guidelines and requirements of [the Act].
Interstate pollution problems aside, vetoes only result when the EPA objects after the state
has proposed to issue the permit. Nonetheless, the state must transmit the initial application to the EPA, and notify them of every "action related to the consideration" of the
permit. These provisions are superfluous if the EPA cannot comment on the application in
the initial stages.
89
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A degree of subterfuge may result if the state automatically
acquiesces in recommendations of denial, or if the EPA uses recommendations only when vetoes will inevitably follow. 93 These
abuses are best checked by ensuring that the state make an accurate initial decision, based on a full consideration of the application. There is no need for federal review of every state agency
action-if the states are given decisionmaking authority, their
courts must be presumed competent to review these decisions.
C. A Proposalfor Reform
Superior alternatives to federal review of recommendations
exist. State courts should review state decisions, and federal appellate courts should review subsequent EPA vetoes. This process
would permit binding review of the decisionmaking agency, on an
appropriate record, without the metaphysical inquiry into who
"made" the decision. EPA recommendations should not be reviewed in federal courts. Under the criteria for reviewability
adopted by the lower federal courts, the most straightforward
rationale is that recommendations are simply "inappropriate for
review." 94 Recommendations are informal and advisory, and unsuited to review on the merits. Courts could also persuasively
deny review on grounds that the recommendations are committed
to agency discretion,95 that alternative remedies are available, 96 or
that legislative intent impliedly precludes review. 97 Courts might
also find recommendations unreviewable because they are not "final," but this ground is less compelling.9 8

93 Short of a veto, the EPA has no direct leverage over the state. Recall of the state's
permit authority is unlikely absent unusual circumstances. Vetoes are to be used sparingly,
in matters of exceptional importance. See note 89 and accompanying text supra. In such
cases the EPA might prefer to make a veto and defend it expeditiously, rather than allowing the matter to meander through state court. Assuming the EPA took a "hard look" at
the problem, it could probably defend the veto with relative ease. See note 82 supra.
" See language quoted in text accompanying note 73 supra. See generally Davis Assocs.,
Inc. v. Secretary, 498 F.2d 385, 390 (Ist Cir. 1974) (denying review of a housing decision
because issues not appropriate for review); K. DAVIs, supra note 65, §§ 28.08 & 28.16-1
(1976).
95 See notes 71, 72 & 82 and accompanying text supra.
96 See notes 56 & 67 and accompanying text supra.
, See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
98 See notes 55, 67 & 89-92 and accompanying text supra. Judge Wallace, in dissent, felt
that the action was final. 585 F.2d at 420. Because EPA recommendations are, in theory,
subject to reversal by the State Board, they are nonfinal. It can be argued, however, that
because recommendations contemplate "expected conformity," they are final actions. See id.
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Vetoes, on the other hand, must be reviewed in federal court.
They represent final, determinative EPA decisions. Washington v.
EPA notwithstanding,9" the courts of appeals should exercise original jurisdiction under section 509(b)(1)(F).' 0 0 Further, allowing
review of vetoes to flounder in district court violates the Act's
goals of uniformity and administrative efficiency.
The proposed scheme rejects Shell's "functional equivalence"
theory by establishing the reviewability of recommendations and
vetoes as matters of law. State courts will consider EPA
recommendations in the context of reviewing state agency actions.
Federal courts of appeals will expeditiously resolve federal-state
disputes that survive in the form of an EPA veto. The scheme
reduces administrative delays and allows a flexible balance between federal guidance and state autonomy.
Daniel W. Emery

99 573 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1978). See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.
100 The Washington v. EPA court misapplied precedent. It cited Mianus River Preserva-

tion Comm'n v. Administrator, 541 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1976), and Save the Bay, Inc. v.
Administrator, 556 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1977), as direct authority, failing to distinguish
between an actual veto and decisions not to review or not to veto permits. The EPA is not
required to review state permits, or even to veto them where the permit concededly violates the Act. See Act § 402(d)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(3) (1976); Save the Bay, Inc. v.
Administrator, 556 F.2d at 1294. It is difficult to characterize a failure to veto as an action
"issuing or denying" a permit. A veto, on the other hand, absolutely denies the permit. Act
§ 402(d)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2)(B) (1976).
In Mianus River, the court explicitly stated that its holding did not extend to cases
where the EPA was actually involved in the state decision, and intimated that Shell might be
such a case. 541 F.2d at 909. The court also expressed its opinion, in which the EPA
apparently concurred, that a veto would be reviewable in the courts of appeals under Act §
509(b)(1)(F), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F) (1976). Id. at 909 & n.26.
Even the Shell majority agreed with this conclusion. Apparently unencumbered by precedent (Washington was decided one year before in the same circuit), the majority said of
the subsequent EPA veto: "That decision is reviewable in this court under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1369(b)(1)." 585 F.2d at 412.
Recommendations, on the other hand, do not "deny" permits-the state is free to
ignore the recommendation. The Act's goals of limiting review and preserving state autonomy militate against stretching § 509(b)(1)(F), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F) (1976) to include recommendations. See note 16 supra; text accompanying. notes 81 & 87 supra.
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